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Abstract In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share
the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the episte-
mic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer
disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010)
Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachron-
ically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple
epistemic systems and used to investigate the role of consensus and difference split-
ting in peer disagreement. I find that the very possibility of multiple epistemic systems
downgrades the epistemic value of consensus and makes difference splitting a subop-
timal strategy.
Keywords Peer disagreement · Epistemic systems · Alvin Goldman ·
Hegselmann–Krause model · Netlogo
1 Introduction
In the early days of economics, Adolphe Quetelet aspired to treat the social world like
geometry. He assumed that there are general principles to be found in the social world
that are concealed randomly distributed errors. Quetelet looked for general principles
with a (potentially very large) number of allowances for those factors that only exert a
minor influence. His aim was to statistically characterize the regularities of the social
world like astronomers statistically reconstruct orbits from scattered observations.
John Stuart Mill, on the other hand, believed that even small factors could have a large
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influence on the entire system. Hence he was suspicious of allowances and instead
looked for the exceptionless tendencies behind the phenomena.1 This is an example
of peer disagreement caused by different epistemic systems. Now imagine Quetelet
and Mill were given the exact same dataset and were asked to estimate the probability
of a double-dip recession in the US. Would they reach a consensus in a finite period
of time? Should they try to do so by splitting the difference? And what would the
epistemic significance of that consensus be?
Peer disagreement is an important topic in social epistemology. A common answer
to the question of how to deal with a disagreeing peer is to ’split the difference’
(Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; Feldman and Warfield 2010), viz. adjust our belief to
make it a mixture of the other’s belief and one’s own. On such a view, sticking to one’s
opinion is irrational. Among others such as Kelly (2010), Douven (2009, 2010) has
challenged this view. Douven claims that longstanding disagreements, viz. a refusal
to split the difference, is endemic in science. Rather than concluding that scientists
are irrational, Douven uses computer simulations to demonstrate that it can indeed be
rational to stick to one’s opinion. He shows that a community of scientists sticking to
their opinion will come near the truth faster, although less accurately so. In situations
where speed is more important than accuracy, for example when time and resources
are scarce, sticking to one’s opinion is therefore rational. Yet, Douven does not make
true on his promise entirely. Sticking to one’s opinion might well be rational when
time and resources are scarce, but these are exactly factors that abound in longstand-
ing disagreements. Although he adduces a good reason for rational disagreement, he
therefore fails to explain longstanding disagreement. A more promising candidate for
the explanation of longstanding disagreement in science is Alvin Goldman’s notion
of “epistemic system”. The literature on peer disagreement, including Douven (2009,
2010), usually does not consider peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems.
(Goldman 2010, p. 208) This can readily be explained by the fact that most scholars are
objectivists. Objectivism holds that there is objective rightness in epistemic standards,
principles and norms. It is often understood as denying the possibility of multiple cor-
rect standards or norms for belief formation. By contrast, Goldman (2010) proposes
a new form of relativism, objectivity-based relativism, which saves objectivism but
allows for two people with the same evidence for a proposition to reasonably disagree
about that proposition. This is possible because peers sharing the same evidence for
a belief might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to form this
belief. Hence rational scientists can disagree indefinitely.
However, Goldman’s framework is not suited to evaluate peer disagreement, as
Goldman himself admits.2 Peer disagreement is a diachronic problem while Goldman
offers only a synchronic treatment. To remedy this I will make use of a simulation.
Simulations are commonly used for diachronic analysis. Scholars in fields such as
physics, computer science, mathematics and philosophy have developed simulations
of opinion dynamics, e.g. Lehrer and Wagner (1981), Hegselmann and Krause (2002,
1
“The body does not only move in that manner unless counteracted, it tends to move in that manner even
when counteracted.” (Mill 1872, p. 444)
2
“The framework I employ here lacks sufficient tools for a detailed analysis of [this] problem.” (Goldman
2010, p. 210)
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2005, 2006). These descriptions usually focus on the conditions under which opinions
converge or polarize. Although an agent-based model will lie at the heart of my paper,
my aim is normative rather than descriptive: to investigate how an epistemic agent
should react when disagreeing with an epistemic peer.
Models of opinion dynamics have already proven to be ideal testing grounds for
exploring peer disagreement. On the Lehrer–Wagner model, agents in a group update
their beliefs based on the weighted averages of the beliefs of all others in the group.
The Hegselmann–Krause model assumes that agents only update their beliefs when
other agents are within a certain (symmetrical or asymmetrical) “confidence interval”.
This reflects the idea that agents will not take into account views that radically diverge
from their own. In both the Lehrer–Wagner model and the Hegselmann–Krause model
agents must split the difference with each other in order to arrive at consensus. Hence
not splitting the difference and agreeing to disagree is considered to be irrational. Dou-
ven (2010) uses the model of opinion dynamics developed by Rainer Hegselmann and
Ulrich Krause because finds this model particularly suited for the purpose of simulating
peer disagreement. In order to develop a diachronic perspective on multiple epistemic
systems I will therefore use the Hegselmann–Krause model (HK-model), as well.
As such this paper is relevant to the literature in four different ways. (1) It will
evaluate peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems. (2) This will be done
by extending the Hegselmann and Krause (2002, 2005, 2006) to multiple epistemic
systems, thus (3) providing a diachronic treatment of Goldman (2010) and (4) meet
Douven (2010)’s demand for an account of rational longstanding disagreement.
2 Epistemic systems
According to Goldman (2010), epistemic systems are “sets of norms, standards, or
principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states.” (Goldman 2010, p. 187) A
crucial difference between relativists and objectivists is that the latter believe there is
a uniquely correct epistemic system, while the former do not. Objectivism, the view
that there is a uniquely correct epistemic system, seems to imply the Uniqueness The-
sis: there are different attitudes one can have toward a particular proposition (namely
believing, disbelieving or suspending judgment), but given a body of evidence there
is only one correct attitude that is the rationally justified one. As such, the Unique-
ness Thesis renders impossible any rational disagreement. According to Feldman,
epistemic peers who have shared their evidence cannot have rational disagreement.
Just as Douven (2010), Goldman is unsatisfied with frameworks failing to account
for rational disagreement. In his words, he wants to save “the intuition that differ-
ences in intellectual procedure found in diverse cultures, communities, and histori-
cal periods do not reflect wholesale irrationality or epistemic depravity.” (Goldman
2010, p. 202) To argue against the necessary connection between the impossibility of
rational disagreement and objectivism he develops a new form of relativism which he
calls “objectivity-based relativism”. On this view, people that share the same evidence
for a proposition might still disagree because they have different evidence for their
respective epistemic systems. Because they occupy different evidential positions, they
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can be objectively justified in believing different epistemic systems and hence have
different beliefs.
Goldman offers an objectivist account of how rational persons can rationally dis-
agree (synchronic), but on his account the question of how to react to such disagreement
through time (diachronic) is left unexplained. (Christensen 2007, p. 188) describes this
diachronic problem as: “How should I react when I discover that my friend and I have
very different beliefs on some topic? […] Should my discovery of her differing degree
of belief in P lead me to revise my own confidence in P?” In particular, Goldman won-
ders “Must their beliefs converge? Must the mode of convergence involve splitting
the difference?” (Goldman 2010, p. 210) As Goldman notes himself, his framework
lacks sufficient tools for a detailed analysis of these questions. In the next section I
will extend to HK-model to include multiple epistemic systems and as such allow
for a diachronic analysis of peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems. In
Sect. 3 I will demonstrate how the model can provide an answer to these two ques-
tions. Finally Sect. 4 discusses to what extent the results in this paper hinge on one’s
definition of “peer”.
3 A model of peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems
Peer disagreement is a diachronic problem because it involves the change of beliefs
through time. A common way to investigate the dynamics of a process is the use of
simulations. Simulations have already been used to investigate peer disagreement, for
example by Douven who notes that the Hegselmann–Krause model “is particularly
suited for this purpose” (Douven 2010, p. 149). Yet the Hegselmann–Krause model
presupposes that all agents adopt the same epistemic system. As a consequence, to
investigate peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems I will need to extend
the model to multiple epistemic systems.
The Hegselmann–Krause model is a model of the opinion dynamics of a group
of agents that are attempting to find the true value of a certain parameter (for exam-
ple the likelihood of a double-dip recession, as in the example above). The value of
the parameter lies within the interval ]0,1]. Initially agents’ beliefs are distributed
uniformly across the range. At each turn agents update their beliefs based on their
own research, which brings them closer to the truth, and the research of others (tes-
timony). Characteristic for the HK-model is that an agent will only update his belief
with the beliefs of peers that do not differ from its belief too substantially, viz. when
the belief is within the agent’s (symmetrical or asymmetrical) “confidence interval”
ε. In an attempt to stay as close as possible to the original HK-model and Douven’s
use of it, I will first replicate Douven’s description of the HK-model exactly and con-
sequently demonstrate that my model is indeed able to reproduce Douven’s results.
Subsequently I will extend the model beyond existing scholarship toward a model of
opinion dynamics under multiple epistemic systems.
Let τ ∈ ]0,1] be the true value of the parameter, xi (u) the opinion of agent
xi after the u-th update, and α ∈ ]0,1] the weighting factor used. Further define
Xi (u) := { j : ∣∣xi (u) − x j (u)
∣
∣ ≤ ε}, and let |Xi (u)|be the cardinality of Xi (u).
Then the opinion of agent xi after the (u + 1)-st turn is represented by the equation:
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Fig. 1 A typical run of the HK-model
xi (u + 1) = α 1|Xi (u) |
∑
j∈Xi(u)
X j (u) + (1 − α) τ (1)
The normative question of how to react to peer disagreement can then be translated
into the model by manipulating the value of ε. With ε = 0 the agent sticks to its opin-
ion. At the next turn, its belief is simply the average of its previous belief and the true
value of τ . A higher value of ε means that the agent is willing to split the difference
(although only with those agents within its confidence interval). I have reproduced
this model in Netlogo.3 A typical run of the model with τ = 0.75, α = 0.5 and ε = 0.1
results in a quick convergence on the true value of τ as shown in Fig. 1.
Douven (2010) extends this model by adding some noise to the data. At each turn
the agents do not receive information about the exact value of τ through their own
research, but about a value that fluctuates around it.
xi (u + 1) = α 1|Xi (u) |
∑
j∈Xi(u)
X j (u) + (1 − α) (τ + rnd (ζ )) (2)
where rnd(ζ ) is a uniformly distributed random real number chosen by each agent
at each turn from the interval [−ζ , +ζ ], with ζ ∈ [0,1]. In such cases the model
demonstrates that agents sticking to their opinion (τ = 0.75, α = 0.5, ε = 0 and ζ = 0.2)
will actually converge faster to values near the truth than agents that split the difference
3 This simulation was programmed in Netlogo v4.1.3. Code available on request.
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Fig. 2 Noisy data with and without difference splitting
(τ = 0.75, α = 0.5, ε = 0.1 and ζ = 0.2). My reproduction of both cases respectively is
shown on the left side of Fig. 2, with red for difference splitting and black for sticking
to one’s opinion. On the right are the results of Douven (2010, p. 151) for the same
settings after 50 ticks.
Now that both the HK-model and Douven’s extension have been successfully repro-
duced, I will extend this model to include multiple epistemic systems. I therefore
introduce the complication that τ is relative to the agent’s epistemic system. As a con-
sequence, as stated by Goldman’s synchronic analysis of multiple epistemic systems,
agents can now rationally disagree about the true value of τ . Moreover, to allow agents
to discriminate between the beliefs of peers within and outside their own epistemic
system, a parameter σ is introduced, which is a fraction of ε. As in the HK-model, the
agents share the same confidence interval ε, but in this extension they apply that con-
fidence interval only to peers within their own epistemic system. As such, ε denotes
the extent to which agents in the model split the difference within their system. The
confidence interval they apply to peers outside their epistemic system is a fraction of
that confidence interval. If σ = 1 agents update their beliefs on all peers within their
confidence interval, regardless of those peers’ epistemic system. If for example σ =
0.5 then the confidence interval with regard to peers from other epistemic systems is
only half of the confidence interval used for peers from within one’s epistemic sys-
tem. σ then denotes the extent to which agents split the difference between epistemic
systems. The model takes the following general form
xi (u + 1) = α 1|Xi (u) |
∑
j∈Xi(u)
X j (u) + (1 − α)τXi (3)
with Xi (u) := { j : ∣∣xi (u) − x j (u)
∣
∣ ≤ σ ε}.
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4 Belief convergence and difference splitting
The reason for extending the HK-model with multiple epistemic systems was to enable
a diachronic analysis of peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems. Gold-
man’s first question was whether it was still desirable for degrees of belief to converge.
His second question concerned the desirability of difference splitting.
The model was run with a population of 100 agents divided evenly across 4 dif-
ferent epistemic systems with τ1= 0.14, τ2= 0.37, τ3= 0.62 and τ4= 0.86. In the plots
the adopters of each epistemic systems receive a different color (red, blue, green,
black respectively). Figure 3 plots for each epistemic system how far its agents are on
average away from its respective truth, accompanied by a plot of the parameter value
chosen at each tick by each agent. Three typical runs of the model are shown with
each time α = 0.5 and various settings of σ and ε.
Strikingly, the members of each system still converge, but not always on the right
value for τ . As a consequence, whereas models such as the HK-model suggest that
consensus has epistemic significance because agents convert on the true value of τ , it
is here demonstrated that this property of the model is not robust against an extension
of the HK-model to multiple epistemic systems.
To further investigate this finding the model was run 10 times for each combination
of σ and ε in an interval [0,1] with an 0,1 increment. For each combination it was
calculated how far the agents were on average removed from the true value of their
respective epistemic system (Total Average Distance) after 1,000 ticks. The average
of this value over 10 runs is represented on the Y-axis of Fig. 4.
Once agents start splitting the difference with agents from other epistemic systems
(σ > 0) a cost in epistemic utility is incurred. This remains invisible (agents con-
verge on the true value of τXi without incurring a cost) if the analysis is restricted
to cases where there are no other epistemic systems (σ = 0). Interestingly, σ and ε
cannot be raised simultaneously without a cost in epistemic utility. The simulations
reveal a tradeoff between splitting the difference within one’s system and splitting
the difference between epistemic systems. In order to make splitting the difference
within one’s system epistemically justified one must decline sharing the difference
with adopters of other epistemic systems. As a consequence, the imperative to always
split the difference is not robust under an extension to multiple epistemic systems.
5 The definition of “peer”
The most important objection against the notion of peer disagreement under multiple
epistemic systems is probably the objection that if agents have a different epistemic
system, they do not share the same evidence and hence they are not peers in the first
place. In this section I offer a phased response to this objection:
(1) In the literature on peer disagreement, the evidence shared by peers is evidence
concerning the belief under consideration, evidence concerning one’s own com-
petence and evidence concerning the competence of peers. The evidence used
to justify one’s choice of epistemic system is usually ignored. (Goldman 2010,
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Fig. 3 Typical runs of the HK-model under multiple epistemic systems
p. 208) As such a minimal result of this paper would be that the notion of “peer”
is narrowed down to peers sharing the same epistemic system.
(2) Narrowing down the definition of “peer” to save the epistemic desirability of dif-
ference splitting in the face of peer disagreement is an artificial solution because
it requires that agents can discriminate between disagreement within and dis-
agreement between epistemic systems. Whether or not agents share the three
usual forms of evidence peers are considered to share can relatively easily be
determined because this judgment is relative to the topic under consideration.
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Fig. 4 Behavior space of the extended HK-model
Agents’ evidence for preferring one epistemic system over another is however
dependent on the entire epistemic history of that agent. As a consequence, the
investment needed to establish whether or not an agent shares the same episte-
mic system is of a different magnitude. It is therefore reasonable to argue that the
cost of establishing whether or not another agent is a peer will often outweigh
the epistemic benefits of difference splitting.
(3) Even if one narrows the definition of peers to peers sharing the same epistemic
system and one is able to discriminate perfectly between peers that apply the same
epistemic system, the problem is not solved but simply displaced. The possibil-
ity of multiple epistemic systems creates a new problem, namely the problem of
“system disagreement”: how to react to peers with different epistemic systems?
If the adherents of one epistemic system split the difference only with other such
adherents, they will indeed converge upon their own truth. But wouldn’t it be
rational for them to at least take note of the fact that others disagree with them,
calling into question their own epistemic system? In other words, the possibility
of multiple epistemic systems creates a new dilemma between sticking to one’s
opinion and splitting the difference, but this time it is situated on a higher level,
namely the level of systems. Paradoxically, then, the model in this paper has dem-
onstrated that in order to create the circumstances in which it is always rational
to split the difference requires that one sticks to one’s opinion with respect to
one’s own epistemic system. The possibility of multiple epistemic systems thus
threatens to render the imperative to always split the difference incoherent. If one
decides to narrow the definition of “peer” to agents sharing the same epistemic
system, then one is not splitting the difference with regard to one’s epistemic
system. But if one decides peers can have different epistemic systems (as shown
in the simulation) communities of peers will not converge on the truth.
123
2556 Synthese (2013) 190:2547–2556
6 Conclusion
In the debate on peer disagreement, difference splitting and consensus are both widely
considered to be epistemically desirable. This is supported by models of opinion
dynamics such as the HK-model. Both Igor Douven and Alvin Goldman object that
these models cannot account for longstanding disagreement. However, Douven only
explains short-term disagreement and Goldman only gives a synchronic treatment of
epistemic systems unable to evaluate normative claims on peer disagreement. This
paper has provided an extension of the HK-model, extending Douven’s critique of
difference splitting to long-term disagreement and making Goldman’s treatment of
epistemic systems diachronic. As anticipated, the resulting model was able to analyse
peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems. The model demonstrated that
the epistemic desirability of difference splitting and consensus is not robust against an
extension to multiple epistemic systems. Whereas the HK-model typically converges
to the truth, it does not when multiple epistemic systems are present in the scien-
tific community. This is an important theoretical result because the very possibility of
multiple epistemic systems already undermines the trust one should put in difference
splitting and consensus because of the transaction costs associated with determining
the presence of epistemic systems (see Sect. 5). Moreover the possibility of multiple
epistemic systems complicates the peer disagreement debate by raising the problem
of how to respond to system disagreement.
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